Pete Wilson and the Republicans won the 1994 elections on the backs of Hispanic immigrants, and turned California from a Republican-leaning state into a Democratic stronghold.
And now Trump is about to do the same nationally.
How can I say this?
In 1994, California voters approved Proposition 187 by a decisive 59–41% margin. The measure sought to deny public education, non-emergency health care, and social services to undocumented immigrants. Most of it was quickly blocked in court — but its political effects reshaped California for generations.
Before Prop 187, California was a purple state with a Republican lean, especially at the presidential and gubernatorial level.
Prop 187 is widely credited by political scientists and strategists with:
- Alienating an entire generation of Latino voters
- Accelerating registration and turnout
- Driving a sharp, lasting demographic realignment
- Turning California from competitive → deep blue
This transformation took hold dramatically between 1994 and 2000, and by 2004 California was effectively unwinnable for Republicans.
Prop 187 didn’t just shift attitudes.
It mobilized, politicized, and unified immigrant communities — especially Latinos — producing a 10–15 point pro-Democratic swing and a surge in voter registration and engagement that permanently altered the state’s political trajectory.
Political scientists call this a group-threat backlash: when a community perceives itself as targeted, it becomes more politically cohesive, increases turnout, and shifts strongly toward the party viewed as its defender.
To see the future, look to California’s past.
The dynamics unleashed by Proposition 187 are now emerging again — but this time, across the entire nation.
The Backlash Has Already Begun — CNN’s November 2025 Election Data Confirms It
In the first statewide elections of Trump’s second term, CNN found dramatic Latino swings back toward Democrats:
Latinos voted 2-to-1 for Democrats
In both:
- Virginia (governor)
- New Jersey (governor)
California:
Latinos backed a Democratic-supported ballot measure 71% to 29%.
Latino Trump voters are defecting at 2–3× the rate of non-Latino Trump voters
According to CNN:
- 24% of Latino Trump 2024 voters supported the Democratic measure in CA
- 18% voted for Democrat Mikie Sherrill in NJ
- Only 7–12% of Trump voters overall defected
Source:
This is precisely the pattern predicted by group-threat theory — and it is already observable in actual election results.
Why This Backlash Will Be Larger and More National Than Prop 187
Proposition 187 targeted one community in one state.
Trump’s second-term immigration actions in 2025 — including expanded ICE workplace operations, revived large-scale deportation priorities, and new cooperation programs between local law enforcement and federal immigration authorities — have created a national climate of threat for a broad and diverse set of communities.
The groups politically activated today include:
- Immigrants
- Naturalized citizens
- U.S.-born children of immigrants
- Latinos, Asians, Africans, Middle Easterners, and Caribbean-origin communities
- Mixed-status families
- Anyone perceived as “looking immigrant”
- Anyone connected to these communities
And this is a much larger share of the electorate.
Naturalized citizens
~10% of all eligible voters (Pew Research Center
U.S.-born children of immigrants
Estimated 10–15% based on ACS / Census ancestry data.
Together, immigrant-origin voters likely represent 20–25% of the U.S. electorate.
And crucially, they are concentrated in the states that decide national power:
- Arizona
- Nevada
- Georgia
- North Carolina
- Pennsylvania
- Michigan
- Wisconsin
- Texas
- Florida
A Prop 187-style backlash in these states is inevitable, not theoretical.
And guess what, the voting-eligible percentage of the population is growing rapidly, so the impact will become even more pronounced over time.
Methodology Note
The following scenarios are illustrative if–then projections, grounded in:
- Historical cases (Prop 187, SB 1070)
- Group-threat political science
- ACS demographic distributions
- CNN’s 2025 Latino vote data
- Known partisan voting elasticities in swing states
These are not statistical forecasts, but structured political simulations based on observed trends.
Three 2026–2028 National Scenarios
We model three levels of backlash intensity:
- Strong: +15-point Democratic swing among immigrant-origin voters
- Moderate: +10-point swing
- Mild: +5-point swing
CNN’s 2025 data already shows Latino Trump defection rates consistent with the strong scenario.
Scenario 1 — Strong Backlash (+15 points + turnout surge)
Presidency
- Democrats flip AZ, NV, GA, NC
- Democrats hold MI, WI, PA
- Democrats reach 300–320 Electoral Votes
Senate
- Democrats pick up:
- Arizona
- North Carolina
- Georgia
- Democrats secure MI, WI, PA, NV
- Texas could become competitive by 2028–2032
- The Senate map becomes structurally more favorable — more competitive seats in Sunbelt states
House
- Democrats gain 15–35 seats
- Texas: 6–10 pickups
- CA + NY combined: 6–10 additional flips or solidifications
- GOP suburban base erodes sharply
- Democrats secure a durable House majority
Bottom Line:
This is the California effect, scaled to the entire country.
Scenario 2 — Moderate Backlash (+10 points)
Presidency
- Democrats win 280–300 EV
- NC becomes the tipping-point state
Senate
- Democrats gain 1–2 seats
- Republicans must defend TX, FL, GA, NC at great cost
House
- Democrats gain 8–15 seats
Scenario 3 — Mild Backlash (+5 points)
Presidency
- Democrats gain 0.5–1 point in AZ, NV, GA, NC
- Race leans Democratic
Senate
- GOP remains viable, but its structural advantage weakens
- NC, GA, and eventually TX become competitive every cycle
House
- Democrats gain 2–8 seats
Now let’s add “Age-In” and Demographic Growth!
Up to now, the scenarios focused on swing among existing immigrant-origin voters.
But there’s a second engine under the hood: demographic replacement — especially young Latino citizens turning 18 and entering the electorate.
1. How many Latino citizens age into the electorate?
UnidosUS estimates that between 2011 and 2028, an average of 878,000 Latino citizen children turn 18 each year, and that by 2024 that number reaches 1 million per year.
Pew estimates that Latino eligible voters grew from 32.3 million in 2020 to 36.2 million in 2024, accounting for about half of all net growth in the U.S. electorate over that period.
The Census Bureau reports that between 2022 and 2023, Hispanics accounted for just under 71% of all U.S. population growth, driven mainly by births.
Put together, that implies:
Roughly 1,000,000 new Latino citizens turning 18 every year in the mid-2020s. Latino citizens are responsible for a disproportionate share of new eligible voters every cycle.
2. What does that mean by 2026 and 2028?
Let’s do conservative, back-of-the-envelope math:
2024 → 2026: ≈ 2 million new Latino citizens turn 18 2024 → 2028: ≈ 4 million new Latino citizens turn 18
Not all will vote, of course. Assume:
Turnout ~35% in a midterm (2026) Turnout ~50–55% in a presidential year (2028)
That yields roughly:
2026 midterm: 2 million newly eligible Latino citizens 35% turnout ≈ 700,000 actual voters 2028 presidential: 4 million newly eligible Latino citizens 50% turnout ≈ 2,000,000 actual voters
Now layer in the backlash:
If Democrats are winning the “new cohort” by, say, +20 points (60–40) under a strong group-threat backlash, then:
2026 net margin gain: 700k votes × 20% = +140,000 net Democratic votes 2028 net margin gain: 2,000k votes × 20% = +400,000 net Democratic votes
These net gains are on top of any swing among older voters.
3. Where are these new voters?
We don’t have a simple single table that says “X new Latino 18-year-olds per state in 2026/2028,” but we know a few things:
Latino population growth is heavily concentrated in: CA, TX, FL, NY, NJ, AZ, NV, GA, NC and parts of CO, IL, WA.
Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) tabulations by race/ethnicity show the existing state-level racial/ethnic composition of eligible voters, which can be projected forward using age and population projections.
If we assume (conservatively) that 60% of new Latino 18-year-olds live in ~10 key states (AZ, NV, GA, NC, TX, FL, CA, CO, PA, WI):
By 2028, that’s ~4M new Latino eligibles × 60% = 2.4M in key states At 50% turnout, ≈ 1.2M votes cast At a +20-point Democratic margin, that’s +240,000 net Democratic votes spread across ~10 high-impact states
In a competitive state with ~5 million total votes, an extra 24,000 net Democratic votes is roughly 0.5 percentage points of margin.
That means demographic growth alone can add about +0.3 to +0.8 points to the Democratic margin in key states by 2028 — on top of any attitudinal swing among older voters.
🔹 How This Changes the Three Scenarios
We can now think of each scenario as having two layers:
Swing layer: change in preference among existing immigrant-origin voters Age-in layer: the compositional shift from millions of new, more Democratic-leaning voters
1. Strong Backlash Scenario (Swing + Growth)
Previously, we modeled:
Presidency: Dems at 300–320 EV Senate: +2–3 seats and a clearly Dem-tilted map House: +15–35 seats
With the age-in effect:
Add ≈+0.5 to +1.0 points to Democratic margins in AZ, NV, GA, NC, and slowly in TX and FL by 2028 That makes:
AZ, NV, GA, NC not just competitive, but increasingly hard for Republicans to win.
TX on track to become a true presidential and Senate battleground in the early 2030s
The presidential EV range is now at the upper end of that 300–320 estimate, and the Senate/HOUSE gains become more resilient even in slightly worse national environments
2. Moderate Backlash Scenario
Previously:
Presidency: Dems 280–300 EV Senate: +1–2 seats House: +8–15 seats
Add the age-in layer:
+0.3–0.6 points extra margin in major Sunbelt & Rustbelt battlegrounds by 2028.
Marginal states like NC and GA become “lean D” instead of pure toss-ups.
Texas/Florida become more competitive at the edges.
This nudges the EV expectation toward the high 280s to low 300s and makes a Dem House majority significantly more likely.
3. Mild Backlash Scenario
Previously:
Presidency: Dem-tilt but still close
Senate: GOP still viable, but with more Dem opportunities
House: +2–8 seats for Democrats
Add age-in:
+0.1–0.3 points of extra margin in key states by 2028
On its own, that’s not enough to realign the map, but:
In states where the presidential or Senate margin is <1 point, those small demographic shifts matter a lot. They can:
Flip a seat in a close year.
Provide a buffer in a neutral year.
Turn “one-off” Dem wins into repeatable wins over multiple cycles
Counter-Scenario: What Could Prevent a Full Backlash?
A few developments could reduce or slow the backlash:
- A major economic boom
- Immigration enforcement perceived as fair or limited
- Effective GOP Latino/Asian outreach
- Democratic underperformance or missteps
- A major external crisis (war, recession) shifting priorities
These shape magnitude, not direction, and right now, these are all going in the wrong direction for Republicans.
The Democratic Opportunity: A Durable Multi-Ethnic Coalition
The political implications for Democrats are significant:
- Reunification of the Latino coalition
- Rising civic engagement among Asian, African, and Caribbean-origin voters
- Higher youth turnout
- Weakening Republican support in suburbs
- Texas and Florida drifting toward competitiveness
- A structurally bluer Senate map
- A stable House majority
- A presidential map increasingly favorable through the 2030s
Republicans had been making real inroads with segments of the Latino and Asian vote.
Trump’s second-term immigration crackdown has stopped those gains — and begun reversing them.
It may become the largest pro-Democratic realignment since the 1930s.
And Republicans themselves will have triggered it.
Final Word
California’s Prop 187 taught an enduring lesson:
Targeting immigrant communities unleashes a political backlash powerful enough to reorder politics for a generation.
Trump’s 2025 policies have recreated those conditions — not in one state, but nationwide.
The 2025 results in Virginia, New Jersey, and California show the pattern starting in real time.
To see the future, look to California’s past.
If the trend continues, the U.S. may be entering a new political era defined by a rising, energized immigrant-origin electorate — and a durable Democratic advantage built not by Democratic strategy, but by Republican overreach.
Kevin Mireles 